Utopia Talk / Politics / Trump supports ISIS

FoxNEWS Member	Sat Nov 18 11:31:13 The BBC has uncovered details of a secret deal that let hundreds of IS fighters and their families escape from Raqqa, under the gaze of the US and British-led coalition and Kurdish-led forces who control the city. ….The deal to let IS fighters escape from Raqqa — de facto capital of their self-declared caliphate…would spare lives and bring fighting to an end. The lives of the Arab, Kurdish and other fighters opposing IS would be spared. But it also enabled many hundreds of IS fighters to escape from the city….Has the pact, which stood as Raqqa’s dirty secret, unleashed a threat to the outside world — one that has enabled militants to spread far and wide across Syria and beyond? ….Publicly, the SDF said that only a few dozen fighters had been able to leave, all of them locals. But one lorry driver tells us that isn’t true. “We took out around 4,000 people including women and children — our vehicle and their vehicles combined. When we entered Raqqa, we thought there were 200 people to collect. In my vehicle alone, I took 112 people.” ….Another driver says the convoy was six to seven kilometres long….Footage secretly filmed and passed to us shows lorries towing trailers crammed with armed men. Despite an agreement to take only personal weapons, IS fighters took everything they could carry. Ten trucks were loaded with weapons and ammunition. ….In light of the BBC investigation, the coalition now admits the part it played in the deal. Some 250 IS fighters were allowed to leave Raqqa, with 3,500 of their family members.
Pillz Member	Sat Nov 18 11:39:15 Whered they go
Paramount Member	Sat Nov 18 11:48:37 Lebanon.
swordtail Anarchist Prime	Sat Nov 18 12:01:29 there's good isis and then there's bad isis. this was good isis.
jergul large member	Sat Nov 18 12:13:58 These kind of deals are widespread and key to de-escalation in Syria. Isis left Aleppo under a similar deal with rebels there, but the main initiator of such deals is the Syrian regime. Not every battle has to be a Salafist or secular Alamo.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sat Nov 18 12:42:35 Perhaps ISIS and Hezbollah will kill each other off.
jergul large member	Sat Nov 18 12:56:53 HR No. But I am happy to play the moral equivalency game. How many nukes has ISIS used against civilian populations?
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sat Nov 18 13:36:58 Let's use a more realistic parameter. How many people have ISIS murdered in cold blood? And How much history has ISIS destroyed or stolen?
werewolf dictator Member	Sat Nov 18 15:01:22 hillary and isis as fellow ideologues were funded by the same people [qatar and saudi arabia] meanwhile trump [with putin and assad] has annihilated the islamic state [which last democrat president allowed to grow and flourish]
pillz Member	Sat Nov 18 15:19:55 "These kind of deals are widespread and key to de-escalation in Syria. Isis left Aleppo under a similar deal with rebels there, but the main initiator of such deals is the Syrian regime. " Syrian Government deals generally stipulate an end point for the exiting fighters. Where did the US allow the ISIS fighters and their families to flee to, both in Raqqa and in Mosul?
Paramount Member	Sat Nov 18 15:30:47 They are going to Lebanon. Or possibly to Israel or Saudi Barbaria first, to rest and collect themselves at a spa, before going to their next battle in Lebanon.
Trolly Member	Sat Nov 18 15:57:25 Oh werewolf dicktaster.
jergul large member	Sat Nov 18 23:26:02 HR Still a lot less than the number of people killed and artifacts destroyed in cold blood in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. You should probably stop with moral equivalency. The US will lose every time. Pillz There are definately drop off points. I am not sure what you are suggesting.
jergul large member	Sat Nov 18 23:27:27 Do you really think the Japanese will ever truly forgive that?
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 05:29:19 We've been through that several dozen times before. Hiroshima was a sound military decision. It was estimated over 250,000 American casualties and well over a million Japanese killed had we invaded. The Japanese were teaching their people to fight with rakes and hoes and sticks for Christ's sake. As for forgiving, I venture to say I have known many more Japanese people than you have and the subject of those bombings never came up.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 05:38:25 I do admit I was never certain the second bomb was necessary or if it should have been dropped that soon after Hiroshima, but that is just me. It may have been necessary, just not sure of the timing.
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 05:41:22 HR You nuked civilians, bro. What you tell yourself about it is about as interesting as listening to what ISIS has to say about what it does. Just stop with moral equivalency. You will lose every time and twice on Sunday.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 07:29:34 Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were legitimate military targets. "and well over a million Japanese killed had we invaded. The Japanese were teaching their people to fight with rakes and hoes and sticks for Christ's sake." The bombs saved a great many lives, especially Japanese lives. If you did not want to discuss moral equivalency, then why did you bring it up? You cannot have your cake and eat it too. You lose this argument yet again. -30-
Hrothgar Member	Sun Nov 19 08:13:08 Correction: "We", as in American citizens of today, did not nuke civilians. That was our forbearers doing. So no, HR did not nuke anyone. Even if at times he would like to claim the deed. Now, if we want to discuss the action in context of World War 2 and the alternative options had they not been used - then ok. I find it hard to believe ANY of the WW 2 powers would not have used nukes had they had them in that war. Weighing Moral equivalence here, in 2017, about it is idiocy. Weighing morally equivalence in regard to the various nations and beliefs of 1945 is the correct way to reason such extreme actions to understand them.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 09:19:46 Hrothgar, solid. However, for what it's worth. Harry made the decision to use nukes and his hometown, Independence MO, is virtually a suburb of Kansas City and I was six years old when he ordered the bombs dropped. So while I am pushing the 'WE' a tad, it's really not all that much. Especially since I have always admired him. Forgive me for being presumptuous. :)
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 10:08:11 HR Legitimate targets in the same way the WTC was a legitimate target. Hrothgar Quite American to argue that history does not matter. It starts anew, sinless, with every new administration, right? You nuked civilians, bro.
Hrothgar Member	Sun Nov 19 10:28:47 Yeah yeah, and those Japanese civilians raped and killed and plundered Chinese, Koreans, and Philipinos? Under the same logic I suppose they did. Not to mentioned they also apparently could be directly responsible for attacking Pearl Harbor. And so, perhaps under this logic they weren't so undeserving of death by nuclear flash after all. If descendants and fellow citizens removed directly of evil deeds are still guilty of such acts by relation to their ancestors and fellow citizens directly involved - then it does bite both ways I suppose.
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 11:08:41 Hrothgar They made you do it, eh ("Now look what you made me do" - 3rd pillar of US foreign policy). Congratulations, you have morally equivalated your way to somewhat less ethical than ISIS. Just stop with moral equivalency. The US will lose every time.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 11:33:41 jergul - HR Legitimate targets in the same way the WTC was a legitimate target. I guess there were some offices in the WTC that could have been considered a military target, but a terrorist attack is very different than a planned military attack by one nation against another nation. You are aware that every time one of you Yahoos bring this up you are beaten to a pulp aren't you? Back then the Japanese considered Hirohito a god, a direct descendant of Amaterasu, they would have followed him off a cliff if they were asked. Hirohito had made a visit to The United States back then. As he was returning home his plane stopped in Hawaii for refueling and he deplaned for some reason. A little sightseeing I believe. I asked every one of the Japanese that I knew if they wanted to go out to the airport o catch a glimpse of him. I must have asked at least 40 or 50 people if they wanted to go. Not a single one of them was the least bit interested.
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 12:11:22 HR The intent of using nuclear weapons on civilian populations does not make it better, bro. It makes it worse. Just stop with moral equivalency. I will give you 40 acres and a mule if you could be so kind.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 13:12:45 You are the one that brought it up. And the civilians were collateral damage. There was a lot of military production going on in both cities. The civilians were ***NOT*** the target. If you want to use that argument then you should argue against Lemay's firebombing of several cities. There is the war crime you are after. Nuking the two cities actually saved both American and Japanese lives. -30-
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 13:26:45 http://www...tomic-bomb-anniversary/400448/ On May 10, 1945, three days after Germany had surrendered to the Allied powers and ended World War II in Europe, a carefully selected group of scientists and military personnel met in an office in Los Alamos, New Mexico. With Germany out of the war, the top minds within the Manhattan Project, the American effort to design an atomic bomb, focused on the choices of targets within Japan. The group was loosely known as the Target Committee, and the question they sought to answer essentially was this: Which of the preserved Japanese cities would best demonstrate the destructive power of the atomic bomb? General Leslie Groves, the Army engineer in charge of the Manhattan Project, had been ruminating on targets since late 1944; at a preliminary meeting two weeks earlier, he had laid down his criteria. The target should: possess sentimental value to the Japanese so its destruction would “adversely affect” the will of the people to continue the war; have some military significance—munitions factories, troop concentrations, and so on; be mostly intact, to demonstrate the awesome destructive power of an atomic bomb; and be big enough for a weapon of the atomic bomb’s magnitude. Related Story ‘Less Costly Struggle and Bloodshed’: The Atlantic Defends Hiroshima in 1946 Groves asked the scientists and military personnel to debate the details: They analyzed weather conditions, timing, use of radar or visual sights, and priority cities. Hiroshima, they noted, was “the largest untouched target” and remained off Air Force General Curtis LeMay’s list of cities open to incendiary attack. “It should be given consideration,” they concluded. Tokyo, Yawata, and Yokohama were thought unsuitable—Tokyo was “all bombed and burned out,” with “only the palace grounds still standing.” A fortnight later, at the formal May 10 target meeting, Robert Oppenheimer, the chief scientist on the project, ran through the agenda. It included “height of detonation,” “gadget [bomb] jettisoning and landing,” “status of targets,” “psychological factors in target selection,” “radiological effects,” and so on. Joyce C. Stearns, a scientist representing the Air Force, named the four shortlisted targets in order of preference: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and Kokura. They were all “large urban areas of more than three miles in diameter;” “capable of being effectively damaged by the blast;” and “likely to be unattacked by next August.” Someone raised the possibility of bombing the emperor’s palace in Tokyo—a spectacular idea, they agreed, but militarily impractical. In any case, Tokyo had been struck from the list because it was already “rubble,” the minutes noted. Kyoto, a large industrial city with a population of 1 million, met most of the committee’s criteria. Thousands of Japanese people and industries had moved there to escape destruction elsewhere; furthermore, stated Stearns, Kyoto’s psychological advantage as a cultural and “intellectual center” made the residents “more likely to appreciate the significance of such a weapon as the gadget.” Tokyo had been struck from the list because it was already “rubble,” the minutes noted. Hiroshima, a city of 318,000, held similar appeal. It was “an important army depot and port of embarkation,” said Stearns, situated in the middle of an urban area “of such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged.” Hiroshima, the biggest of the “unattacked” targets, was surrounded by hills that were “likely to produce a focusing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage.” On top of this, the Ota River made it “not a good” incendiary target, raising the likelihood of its preservation for the atomic bomb. The meeting barely touched on the two cities’ military attributes, if any. Kyoto, Japan’s ancient capital, had no significant military installations; however, its beautiful wooden shrines and temples recommended it, Groves had earlier said (he was not at the May 10 meeting), as both sentimental and highly combustible. Hiroshima’s port and main industrial and military districts were located outside the urban regions, to the southeast of the city. The gentlemen unanimously agreed that the bomb should be dropped on a large urban center, the psychological impact of which should be “spectacular” to ensure “international recognition” of the new weapon. * * * The Target Committee regrouped at the Pentagon on May 28 (Oppenheimer sent a representative). The members concentrated on the aiming points within the targeted cities. The plane carrying the atomic bomb “should avoid trying to pinpoint” military or industrial installations because they were “small, spread on fringes of city and quite dispersed.” Instead, aircrews should “endeavor to place … [the] gadget in [the] center of selected city.” They were quite explicit about this: The plane should target the heart of a major city. One reason was that the aircraft had to release the bomb from a great height—some 30,000 feet—to escape the shock wave and avoid the radioactive cloud; that limited the target to large urban areas easily visible from the air. Captain William “Deak” Parsons, associate director of Los Alamos’s Ordnance Division, gave another reason to drop the bomb on a city center: “The human and material destruction would be obvious.” An intact urban area would show off the bomb to great effect. Whether the bomb hit soldiers, ordnance, and munitions factories, while desirable from a publicity point of view, was incidental to this line of thinking—and did not influence the final decision. “No one on the Target Committee ever recommended any other kind of target,” McGeorge Bundy, a Washington insider who later became John F. Kennedy’s national security advisor, later wrote, “and while every city proposed had quite traditional military objectives inside it, the true object of attack was the city itself.” The Target Committee dismissed talk of giving a prior warning or demonstration of the bomb to Japan. Parsons had persistently rejected suggestions of a noncombat demonstration: “The reaction of observers to a desert shot would be one of intense disappointment,” he had warned in September 1944. Even the crater would be “unimpressive,” he said. Groves shared his contempt for “tender souls” who advocated a noncombat demonstration. When the meeting ended, the committee had no doubt about where the first atomic bomb would fall: on the heads of hundreds of thousands of civilians. General Leslie Groves, military head of the Manhattan Project, and Robert Oppenheimer (Wikimedia) During June, the Target Committee narrowed the choice. On the 15th, a memo elaborated on Kyoto’s attributes. It was a “typical Jap city” with a “very high proportion of wood in the heavily built-up residential districts.” There were few fire-resistant structures. It contained universities, colleges, and “areas of culture,” as well as factories and war plants, which were in fact small and scattered, and in 1945 of negligible use. Nevertheless, the committee placed Kyoto higher on the updated “reserved” list of targets (that is, those preserved from LeMay’s firebombing). Kokura, too, made the reserved list. That city possessed one of Japan’s biggest arsenals, replete with military vehicles, ordnance, heavy naval guns, and, reportedly, poison gas. It was the most obvious military target. * * * Another high-powered group ran in parallel with the Target Committee: the Interim Committee of top officials convened by Secretary of War Henry Stimson to advise the president on the future of nuclear power for military and civilian use. On paper, the Interim Committee looked omnipotent. Its permanent members included Stimson; James Byrnes, the president’s “personal representative” pending his appointment as secretary of state; and various other top military and civilian officials. The scientists Oppenheimer, Arthur Compton, Ernest Lawrence, and Enrico Fermi sat on the committee’s scientific panel. General George Marshall, Army chief of staff, and Leslie Groves received open invitations to attend meetings. In practice, the committee’s influence ebbed away. The problem was Stimson. The war secretary anchored his authority to the committee’s success and personally invited the members. Some turned up as a courtesy, but attendance levels swiftly declined. Groves attended once. The immediate demands of the atomic mission preoccupied him; he had little time for Stimson’s visionary talk about the future of atomic power. There was a war to be won. At 10 a.m. on May 31, the committee members filed into the dark-paneled conference room of the War Department. The air was heavy with the presence of three Nobel laureates and Oppenheimer. Stimson opened the proceedings on a portentous note: “We do not regard it as a new weapon merely,” he said, “but as a revolutionary change in the relations of man to the universe.” The atomic bomb might mean the “doom of civilization,” or a “Frankenstein” that might “eat us up”; or it might secure world peace. The bomb’s implications “went far beyond the needs of the present war,” Stimson said. It must be controlled and nurtured in the service of peace. The cool pragmatism did not admit humanitarian arguments, however vibrantly they lived in the minds and diaries of several of the men present. Oppenheimer was invited to review the explosive potential of the bombs. Two were being developed: the plutonium bomb and the fissile uranium bomb. They used different detonation methods and processes, yet both were expected to deliver payloads ranging from 2,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT. Nobody yet knew their precise power. More advanced weapons might measure up to 100,000 tons; and superbombs—thermonuclear weapons—10 million to 100 million tons, Oppenheimer said. The scientists nodded impassively; they were inured to such fantastic figures. However, the numbers and the destruction they implied “thoroughly frightened” incoming Secretary of State Byrnes, as he later admitted. He was human, after all; but beyond his horror at the statistics, he silently ruminated on the wisdom, or madness, of any talk of sharing the secret with Moscow. As such, Byrnes the politician resolved to pursue his “go it alone” policy for America that would pointedly exclude the Russians and indeed the rest of the world from the atomic secret: The bomb’s power would be the future source of American power. Discussion flared on the question of whether to share the secret with Russia (by which point Stimson had left for another meeting). Oppenheimer advocated divulging the secret “in the most general terms.” Moscow had “always been very friendly to science,” he rather lamely observed; he felt strongly, however, that “we should not prejudge the Russian attitude.” Marshall wondered, too, whether a combination of likeminded powers might control nuclear power; the general even suggested that Russian scientists be invited to witness the bomb test at Alamogordo, scheduled for July. Such talk alarmed Byrnes, who had observed the Russians at close quarters at Yalta, and Groves, who was violently opposed to sharing with Moscow a secret he had spent almost four years trying to keep. Byrnes swooped: If “we” were to give information to the Russians “even in general terms,” he argued, Stalin would demand a partnership role and a stake in the technology. Indeed, not even the British possessed blueprints of America’s atomic factories. Byrnes then wrapped up the argument: America should “push ahead as fast as possible in [nuclear] production and research to make certain that we stay ahead and at the same time make every effort to better our political relations with Russia.” All agreed. If anyone noticed this first official recognition of the start of a nuclear-arms race—not with Germany or Japan, but with Russia—he did not say so. After lunch, the meeting’s participants (minus Marshall) examined the next point on the agenda: “the effect of the bombing of the Japanese and their will to fight.” Would the nuclear impact differ much from an incendiary raid? one member of the committee wondered. That rather missed the point, objected Oppenheimer, stung by the suggestion that mere firebombs were in any way comparable: “The visual effect of the atomic bomb would be tremendous. It would be accompanied by a brilliant luminescence which would rise to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet. The neutron effect of the explosion would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile.” The same could not be said of LeMay’s jellied petroleum raids. “Twenty thousand people,” Oppenheimer estimated, would probably die in the attack. Stimson, meanwhile, was personally preoccupied with saving Kyoto, the ancient capital whose temples and shrines he had visited with his wife in 1926. He requested that it be struck from the shortlist of targets. Japan was not just a place on a map, or a nation that must be defeated, he insisted. The objective, surely, was military damage, not civilian lives. In Stimson’s mind the bomb should “be used as a weapon of war in the manner prescribed by the laws of war” and “dropped on a military target.” Stimson argued that Kyoto “must not be bombed. It lies in the form of a cup and thus would be exceptionally vulnerable. … It is exclusively a place of homes and art and shrines.” With the exception of Stimson on Kyoto—which was essentially an aesthetic objection—not one of the committee men raised the ethical, moral, or religious case against the use of an atomic bomb without warning on an undefended city. The businesslike tone, the strict adherence to form, the cool pragmatism, did not admit humanitarian arguments, however vibrantly they lived in the minds and diaries of several of the men present. The question was not “Will this weapon kill civilians?” but rather, “Will any civilians remain?” Total war had debased everyone involved. While older men, such as Marshall and Stimson, shared a fading nostalgia for a bygone age of moral clarity, when soldiers fought soldiers in open combat and spared civilians, they now faced “a newer [morality] that stressed virtually total war,” observed the historian Barton J. Bernstein. In truth, the American Civil War and the Great War gave the lie to that “older morality,” as both men knew. Marshall recommended, for example, on May 29, in discussion with Assistant War Secretary John McCloy, the use of gas to destroy Japanese units on outlying Pacific islands: “Just drench them and sicken them so that the fight would be taken out of them—saturate an area, possibly with mustard, and just stand off.” He meant to limit American casualties with whatever means available. If he drew on outdated civilized values, Stimson grasped the moral implications of nuclear war. The idea of the bomb tormented him—so much that he sought comfort in the notion of recruiting a religious evangelist to “appeal to the souls of mankind and bring about a spiritual revival of Christian principles.” America, he believed, was losing its moral compass just as it might be about to claim military supremacy over the world. The dawn of the atomic era called for a deeper human response, he believed, energized by a spirit of cooperation and compassion. He did not act on his compulsion, but dwelt long on the atomic question—and the question in Stimson’s troubled mind was not “Will this weapon kill civilians?” but rather, if we continue on this course, “Will any civilians remain?” He poured much of his anxiety into his diary. Officially, Stimson seemed contradictory and muddled. In the meetings, he summarized his position on the bomb thus: (1) “We could not give the Japanese any warning;” (2) “We could not concentrate on a civilian area;” (3) “We should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible.” He meant to use the bomb to shock the enemy—“to make a profound impression”—with a display of devastation so horrible that Tokyo would be forced to surrender. However, he insisted it must be a military target. His statement’s inherent contradiction—how could the bomb shock Tokyo without concentrating on a civilian area?—either eluded Stimson, or he lacked the intellectual honesty to confront it. Whatever the case, it provoked no comment in the Interim Committee meeting, and eased the task of James Conant, a prominent scientist on the committee: “The most desirable target,” then, he said, “would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers’ houses.” Stimson persuaded himself that this meant a military target. The physicists on the committee’s scientific panel agreed; Groves ticked off another victory; and the war secretary’s self-deception was complete. A slightly surreal atmosphere lingered, as the men reflected on what they had done. The meeting that had opened with Stimson’s declaration of mankind’s “new relationship with the universe” ended with his approval of the first atomic attack, on the center of a city, to which he consented moments after he had rejected the bombing of civilians. The committee unanimously agreed that the atomic bombs should be used: (1) as soon as possible; (2) without warning; and (3) on war plants surrounded by workers’ homes or other buildings susceptible to damage, in order to make a spectacular impression “on as many inhabitants as possible.” * * * On June 1, 1945, President Harry Truman rose early to prepare a statement for Congress. It was a bright summer’s day, and he chose one of his three new seersucker suits—a gift from a New Orleans cotton company. The president felt refreshed after hosting the prince regent of Iraq at a state dinner a few nights earlier. He had spent Memorial Day on the presidential yacht, cruising the Potomac, playing poker, and approving his speech for the San Francisco Conference on the creation of the United Nations, then in session. That June morning, Truman received Byrnes’s summary of the previous day’s marathon Interim Committee meeting. Byrnes had skillfully exploited his position as the president’s special representative, laying stress where he saw fit, emphasizing the consensus on the weapon’s use and, in effect, relegating Stimson to the sidelines. Byrnes’s upbeat assessment fortified the president for his important speech. “There can be no peace in the world,” Truman told a rapt house, “until the military power of Japan is destroyed. ... If the Japanese insist on continuing resistance beyond the point of reason, their country will suffer the same destruction as Germany.” But the fate of individual cities was still being decided. That month, Stimson asked Groves—then in his office on a different matter—whether the target list had been finalized, and was disturbed to see Kyoto at the top of the list. Again, he ordered it struck off. Groves fudged. They irked him, these meddlesome politicians: The destruction of Kyoto was his to decide; he felt a sense of proprietorial control over how the bomb should be used. The city “was large enough an area for us to gain complete knowledge of the effects of the atomic bomb. Hiroshima was not nearly so satisfactory in this respect.” For weeks, Groves continued to refer to Kyoto as a target despite Stimson’s clear instructions to the contrary. Then, on June 30, Groves very reluctantly informed the Chiefs of Staff that Kyoto had been eliminated as a possible target for the atomic fission bomb and all bombing, by direction of the secretary of war. That left four cities on the target list: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki, listed in order of how well they conformed to the Target Committee’s criteria. Nagasaki, being hilly, was not ideal, but its Mitsubishi Shipyards (then out of use), where Japan’s huge battleships had been built, gave it strong symbolic appeal. On July 25, 1945, Groves finalized these targets in a directive issued for Carl Spaatz, the commanding general of the United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific: “The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets. … Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready.” A clear-weather report for August 6 made Hiroshima the preferred target on the list that day. Seventy years ago, the first atomic bomb fell on the city.
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 13:31:40 So, just stop with moral equivalency. The US will lose every time.
hood Member	Sun Nov 19 13:35:39 Don't bother arguing with jergul. He's dumb and proud of it.
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 14:11:38 Hood What? You think it wrong of me to reference events that took place as long ago as world war 2?
Forwyn Member	Sun Nov 19 15:59:09 Don't start a war if you can't handle the...fallout
jergul large member	Sun Nov 19 18:04:42 Forwyn "This particularly hit Japan's economy hard because 74.1% of Japan's scrap iron came from the United States in 1938. Also, 93% of Japan's copper in 1939 came from the United States.[8] In early 1941, Japan moved into southern Indochina,[9] thereby threatening British Malaya, North Borneo and Brunei. Japan and the U.S. engaged in negotiations during the course of 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan considered withdrawal from most of China and Indochina after drawing up peace terms with the Chinese. Japan would also adopt an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, and would not discriminate in trade, provided all other countries reciprocated. However, these compromises in China were rejected by General Tojo, then War Minister.[10] Responding to Japanese occupation of key airfields in Indochina (July 24) following an agreement between Japan and Vichy France, the U.S. froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1 established an embargo on oil and gasoline exports to Japan.[11][12] The oil embargo was an especially strong response because oil was Japan's most crucial import, and more than 80% of Japan's oil at the time came from the United States.[13] Japanese war planners had long looked south, especially to Brunei for oil and Malaya for rubber and tin. In the autumn of 1940, Japan requested 3.15 million barrels of oil from the Dutch East Indies, but received a counteroffer of only 1.35 million.[14] The Navy was (mistakenly) certain any attempt to seize this region would bring the U.S. into the war,[15][page needed] but the complete U.S. oil embargo removed any hesitancy. Moreover, any southern operation would be vulnerable to attack from the Philippines, then a U.S. commonwealth, so war with the U.S. seemed necessary in any case.[16] After the embargoes and the asset freezes, the Japanese ambassador to Washington, Kichisaburō Nomura, and U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull held multiple meetings in order to resolve Japanese-American relations. No solution could be agreed upon for three key reasons: Japan honored its alliance to Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact. Japan wanted economic control and responsibility for southeast Asia. Japan refused to leave mainland China (without Manchoukuo[clarification needed]).[17] The U.S. embargoes gave Japan a sense of urgency. It would either have to agree to Washington's demands or use force to gain access to the resources it needed. In their final proposal on November 20, Japan offered to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina and not to launch any attacks in southeast Asia provided the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan.[10] The American counterproposal of November 26 (the Hull note) required Japan to evacuate all of China, without conditions, and to conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers." Wiki.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 19:00:18 "Hiroshima, a city of 318,000, held similar appeal. It was *****“an important army depot and port of embarkation*****,” said Stearns, situated in the middle of an urban area “of such a size that a large part of the city could be extensively damaged.” Hiroshima, the biggest of the “unattacked” targets, was surrounded by hills that were “likely to produce a focusing effect which would considerably increase the blast damage.” On top of this, the Ota River made it “not a good” incendiary target, raising the likelihood of its preservation for the atomic bomb."
Forwyn Member	Sun Nov 19 19:07:11 US embargo is not some hidden piece of historical knowledge. You are not entitled to the raw materials of another nation, and their refusal to do business with you is not a moral casus belli. Poor Japs, raping and pillaging across the Southeastern Pacific, and we didn't continue to enable them!
Hot Rod Revved Up	Sun Nov 19 19:55:03 OK, I see your point. Granted, civilians were not considered too much as far as the humanitarian aspects were concerned, I am glad that Stimson got Kyoto removed from the list. Now, consider my point. *****IT WAS TOTAL WAR***** and the Japanese started it. That aside, I repeat. It was estimated that hundreds of thousands of American lives were saved and over a million Japanese lives. Hiroshima: 20,000 soldiers killed 70,000–126,000 civilians killed Nagasaki: 39,000–80,000 killed Total: 129,000–226,000+ killed So, 226,000 lives to save substantially over a million is a small price to save, all things considered. Now, if you continue this argument you will be admitting that you have no consideration for American and Japanese lives. Much worse than I thought. "The Americans were alarmed by the Japanese buildup, which was accurately tracked through Ultra intelligence.[17] Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was sufficiently concerned about high American estimates of probable casualties to commission his own study by Quincy Wright and William Shockley. Wright and Shockley spoke with Colonels James McCormack and Dean Rusk, and examined casualty forecasts by Michael E. DeBakey and Gilbert Beebe. Wright and Shockley estimated the invading Allies would suffer between 1.7 and 4 million casualties in such a scenario, of whom between 400,000 and 800,000 would be dead, while Japanese fatalities would have been around 5 to 10 million."
jergul large member	Mon Nov 20 03:44:34 HR Au contraire. Civilians were the direct target. Also, nuking or invading Japan were not the only two options. A negotiated armistice would be an example of something that could have been done that involved neither nuking, nor invading Japan. Your country has done way to many horrible, horrible things for moral equivalency to ever work in your favour. So just stop using it. It makes ISIS look like a force of good by comparison.
jergul large member	Mon Nov 20 03:48:57 Forwyn Actually, it is. The Japanese tried to negotiate a diplomatic solution. That failed. So it tried to establish a buffer sone in the Pacific instead. It did not want to poke the sleeping tiger. But the alternative was to revert back to the steam age. It amuses me that you think the Japanese have forgiven this. Tell me again how many foreigners are allowed to live in that country? Its like 3 or something, right?
Hot Rod Revved Up	Mon Nov 20 09:12:05 Have it your way, even though not all wanted to target civilians or even bomb a populated area. If the civilians were the target the nukes still saved millions of Japanese lives. jergul - A negotiated armistice would be an example of something that could have been done that involved neither nuking, nor invading Japan. We had a negotiated peace with Germany.
Forwyn Member	Mon Nov 20 09:54:40 The alternative was to simply stop trying to conquer half the world to split with the Axis powers. No, you are not entitled to another nation's raw materials. But I have a feeling you would simultaneously declare the firing on Ft. Sumter unjustified.
jergul large member	Mon Nov 20 10:15:55 Forwyn Like I would consider the war of northern aggression unjustified. Review the link I provided on why negotiations broke down. The Japanese had a far stronger case for war than anything the US has mustered since 1776.
Forwyn Member	Mon Nov 20 14:18:15 As your link states, they had an alternative. Stop raping and pillaging your way across the Southeastern Pacific if you want to do business with us. Not a proper casus belli. And even if you think it is, you don't have a case to whine about war countermeasures. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_note
jergul large member	Mon Nov 20 15:19:27 Forwyn "war countermeasures" for nuking civilian populations is right up there with "final solution to the jewish question" for the holocost. I am demostrating that the US loses the moral equivalency every time. Your country sucks bro. And has sucked for a long, long time.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Mon Nov 20 17:26:13 Norway's proudest achievement was Vidkun Quisling.
Forwyn Member	Mon Nov 20 18:37:56 Perhaps the concept of total war is lost on you. When you mobilize an entire nation in an aggressive war, you can't then pretend that a supermajority of the nation is off limits and innocent. Here's Hiroshima: At the time of its bombing, Hiroshima was a city of both industrial and military significance. A number of military units were located nearby, the most important of which was the headquarters of Field Marshal Shunroku Hata's Second General Army, which commanded the defense of all of southern Japan, and was located in Hiroshima Castle. Hata's command consisted of some 400,000 men, most of whom were on Kyushu where an Allied invasion was correctly anticipated. Also present in Hiroshima were the headquarters of the 59th Army, the 5th Division and the 224th Division, a recently formed mobile unit. The city was defended by five batteries of 7-cm and 8-cm (2.8 and 3.1 inch) anti-aircraft guns of the 3rd Anti-Aircraft Division, including units from the 121st and 122nd Anti-Aircraft Regiments and the 22nd and 45th Separate Anti-Aircraft Battalions. In total, an estimated 40,000 Japanese military personnel were stationed in the city. Hiroshima was a minor supply and logistics base for the Japanese military, but it also had large stockpiles of military supplies. The city was also a communications center, a key port for shipping and an assembly area for troops. It was a beehive of war industry, manufacturing parts for planes and boats, for bombs, rifles, and handguns; children were shown how to construct and hurl gasoline bombs and the wheelchair-bound and bedridden were assembling booby traps to be planted in the beaches of Kyushu.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Mon Nov 20 21:59:58 Good find Forwyn. That should help to clarify things for jergul.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Mon Nov 20 22:00:17 Good find Forwyn. That should help to clarify things for jergul.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Mon Nov 20 22:00:41 Oops.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 00:42:53 HR Target criteria already provided. Hiroshima was hit because it had an untouched civilian population. The whole point was to kill civilians, terrorise the population, and get some good data on what a bomb could do. Terrorism in a classic sense. The point was to hit civilians in a spectacular manner and terrorise the government into ending the war.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 00:45:02 Ending the war unconditionally. Goodness knows. The Japanese might have demanded the emporor remain head of state or something if a negotiated settlement had been the alternative. In sum: Manson would have made a less pathological call.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Tue Nov 21 01:07:05 Bah Humbug!
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 10:26:55 Yes, I suppose it would have been more humane to drop an M47 on the Emperor's head. I imagine the societal impact would have been stronger than the civilians that had already been written off as roadblocks.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 10:40:12 Forwyn Who was the Emperor of Japan in 1947?
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 10:41:39 Point being that you gave the Japanese the only thing they would have insisted on anyway. There are still reasons for the use of nukes instead of negotiations. The problem for you is that those reasons are pathological.
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 11:03:11 It is not the moral responsibility of the aggressed to negotiate with the aggressor.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Tue Nov 21 11:57:34 Keeping Hirohito was MacArthur's idea. That and Incheon were his best decisions.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 12:44:09 Forwyn You nuked civilians, bro.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 12:45:06 HR A moral country would have come up with that negotiating position instead of nuking civilians.
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 12:51:28 I didn't do anything, bro. But yeah, in that position, if I had to weigh 250,000 Jap lives versus 250,000 American lives, I'd pick the latter, every single time.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 12:57:26 We will just stick with you nuked civilians, bro. Or weigh it against either nuking civilians or letting the Japanese emperor remain head of state. You would chose nuking everyday and twice on Sunday (as you indeed did) because of the other pathological reasons for nuking civilians.
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 13:00:42 There is very little value in the distinction of "civilian" when children are being taught guerrilla warfare and the infirm are building booby traps.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 13:08:20 You could make more hay of that argument if Japan had a 2nd ammendment right you could construe into defining all civilians as enemy combatants.
Rugian Member	Tue Nov 21 13:20:09 jergul large member Tue Nov 21 13:08:20 You could make more hay of that argument if Japan had a 2nd ammendment right you could construe into defining all civilians as enemy combatants. Have you seen Red Dawn? That's absolutely a possibility.
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 13:26:11 You think officials in Hiroshima, a major small-arms manufacturing center, wouldn't have handed firearms to children they were already teaching grenade tossing to?
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 14:16:35 You think that a country with 100ds of million small arms with constitutional wording to oppose foreign and domestic tyrants are armed combatants? Besides, the japanese the type 99 is not child friendly, and with fuel limitations...how likely was that molotov cocktail plan anyway? How many 10s of children can you document learned how to throw a bottle against a wall anyway? Something close to 0? Ruggy Only the first one. Those cubans, eh? Point being that by Forwyn's logic, you are all armed combatants.
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 14:18:31 Okay...are we supposed to pretend Axis powers wouldn't have happily nuked Allied population centers?
Forwyn Member	Tue Nov 21 14:23:53 Further, sure. The Japanese were absolutely going to consider dense private ownership when debating a land invasion. But again, the US didn't start the war.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 14:26:22 Would the Axis powers have been as bad as the US? Good question. They surely would when facing an existential threat that would otherwise destroy them. And Germany would have nuked the USSR for kick and giggles just like the US. But against the UK with air supremacy? I doubt it.
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 14:27:11 And Germany would have nuked the USSR for kicks and giggles just like the US did to Japan.*
Hrothgar Member	Tue Nov 21 14:33:47 I think it's pretty safe to say that whatever power perfected nuclear weapons first in the era of WW 2 was going to use the nuclear weapons to end the war and prove a point. We just so happen to live in the universe where the USA won that contest. Also jergul raped English monks in 793 (because his viking ancestors did it).
Hrothgar Member	Tue Nov 21 17:15:45 Look. Yeah, the US were dicks during WW 2. Fine. But you know what? Japan were a bunch of assholes. Really horrible assholes in the preceding years. To people all around them. Now Jergul is coming at this thing through the lens of a pussy. Modern day pussy Europe passing judgment on the dicks of history. But you know what Modern day pussy Europe seems to forget about a lot? Ass holes of history. I guess because they lost? But truly, there were some serious assholes at the start of WW 2. And they needed someone to fuck them up. Otherwise the whole world would be ran by assholes. Sure, there were some pussies around at the start of WW 2, but they could not and did not stop the assholes. Pussies can't fuck anyone. No matter how loud they complain. And so the dicks had a job to do. Fuck those assholes. Sure pussies get fucked by dicks too, and that can be unfortunate - although some would argue pussies should become dicks when needed to secure human progress in regard to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in the face of asshole aggression. Anyhow, the dicks had a job to do. And they did it. They fucked those assholes hard until destroyed. Yes, even so hard that the advent of the nuclear weapons came to fruition. Unfortunate through the eyes of a pussy. But necessary from the perspective of a dick. The assholes never would have ceased efforts to dominate the world if not for dicks of the world fucking their asshole nations so hard.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Tue Nov 21 20:03:15 jergul - Forwyn You nuked civilians, bro. And you supplied the Nazis, bro. Did you know that the Nazis were working on the atom bomb too? Did you know their hard water plant was in Norway? If the allies had not sent a commando raid against that plant then you would be responsible for nuking Moscow and Leningrad and all of their civilians. How does that make you feel to be beholdin' to the allies?
jergul large member	Tue Nov 21 22:36:35 Hrothgar The whole world is run by assholes that never ceased efforts to dominate the world. Back to my point: Moral equivalency is not a game the US should play - ever. It will always lose. As equating yourself to parity with the Nazis illustrates nicely.
Hot Rod Revved Up	Tue Nov 21 22:41:47 Nor you, ever. You should never even bring up morals.
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